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A time of transition

Originally published on The Ukrainian Weekly

To what extent will U.S. policy toward Ukraine change with the departure of President Joe Biden and the ascendancy of Donald Trump? Despite the relentless speculation, the truth of the matter is that nobody knows.  It’s still very much a work in progress.

As vice president in the administration of former President Barack Obama, Mr. Biden was the point man on Ukraine, devoting considerable time and attention to the country, especially following Russia’s initial invasion in 2014.  He often argued – not always successfully – for a more assertive policy, including providing Ukraine with lethal weapons.

Because of his work on Ukraine as vice president and his prior leadership on foreign policy issues in the Senate, Mr. Biden was more familiar with Ukraine than was any other president in U.S. history. This prepared him to deal with Europe’s biggest war since World War II.

Although Mr. Biden’s support for Ukraine has been unparalleled, it is too early to assess his legacy in handling the war. However, at this early stage, as he leaves office, I would characterize it as mixed.  In my view, though, the positives outweigh the negatives.

On the negative side, Mr. Biden has been excessively cautious and slow to respond to Ukrainian requests for certain weapons systems (in some cases, due to lack of surplus stocks), often placing restrictions on their use for fear that Russia might escalate the war to the point of using tactical nuclear weapons. Of course, we saw that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “red lines” were repeatedly crossed and nothing happened. Many observers, including myself, believe that President Biden, whose view of the world was shaped by the Cold War nuclear arms race, was too risk averse. Still, it could be said that it’s easy to play Monday morning quarterback and know what should have been done in hindsight. But it is incalculably more difficult if you are the one making decisions in the moment that could have monumental, devastating consequences – even if the chances of such are minimal.

On the positive side, it was President Biden who resolutely rallied our allies and friends across the globe in assembling unprecedented support for Ukraine once Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022. The significance of this cannot be overstated.  Also of utmost importance, and often overlooked, is President Biden’s rallying the American people and Congress to stand with Ukraine. He did so by using the powerful bully pulpit of the presidency.  More consequentially, under his leadership record amounts of military and other security capabilities, including weapons, training and intelligence, were provided to Ukraine. Moreover, the Biden administration provided a vast array of economic and other non-military assistance to the war-torn country. This is in addition to the imposition of unprecedented sanctions and other punitive measures place on Russia, such as export controls that have weakened the aggressor. With the war entering its fourth year, these positives sometimes are taken for granted.

The Biden administration is doing what it can to get security assistance and economic support – especially direct budget assistance – out the door before Mr. Biden’s term ends. A total of nearly $6 billion in military and direct budget support was announced on December 30, and $500 million in military support on January 9. This is in addition to the U.S. providing its $20 billion share of the Group of Seven’s (G-7) $50 billion loan to Ukraine, paid for by the windfall proceeds secured from Russia’s frozen assets.

Although it is impossible to know for sure (and, yes, I plead guilty of counterfactual speculation here), I doubt that any of Mr. Biden’s predecessors since Ukraine’s 1991 independence would have handled this war any better than he did.  I’ll go even further and suggest that most – probably all – would have done worse.

The bottom line is that, if Mr. Biden would have been bolder and quicker in the provision of weapons, Ukraine would now be in a stronger battlefield position. On the other hand, if it were not for Mr. Biden’s national and global leadership, Ukraine would be in dire, highly precarious and worse circumstances.

As we transition to the Trump presidency, there is tremendous uncertainty as to how President Trump will approach the war in Ukraine. Those who are not worried haven’t been paying attention for the last decade to Mr. Trump’s numerous unfavorable words and deeds with respect to Ukraine. His record on Ukraine during and after his presidency, despite some of the “Trump world” spin, was weak, and his affection for Putin is downright eerie.

However, since the November election, Mr. Trump has been giving mixed signals on his stance toward Ukraine.

Some of his national security picks, such as Pete Hegseth for secretary of the Defense Department, are problematic at best. Perhaps none are more problematic than the disgraceful choice of Tulsi Gabbard as director of National Intelli­gence. Other nominees are encouraging – notably retired Gen. Keith Kellogg as special envoy for Ukraine and – albeit to a lesser extent – the choice of Mike Waltz as national security advisor and Marco Rubio as secretary of the State Department. They and some others nominated to be in the Trump administration at least have a fundamental understanding of the danger Russia poses to our national security interests and the U.S.-led international order.

Mr. Trump himself has been inconsistent in his remarks about Ukraine. But in recent weeks he has been saying some things that suggest a growing recognition that achieving lasting peace – perhaps even a cease-fire – will be considerably more complicated than he initially thought. While there are no guarantees when it comes to the erratic Mr. Trump, I hope that the more he learns about the war’s realities and the more he sees of Putin’s intransigence and insincerity (i.e. that concessions apply only to the Ukrainians, not to Russia), the more supportive of Ukraine he will become.

As matters stand now, Putin does not want peace, but rather Ukraine’s capitulation. The antidote to that is a policy of peace through strength. And that may just mean taking the Biden administration’s already considerable support for Ukraine and elevating it with more military aid and the expansion of punitive economic measures. Despite Putin’s bravado, Russia has serious economic, military and political vulnerabilities. Simply put, the more pressure Ukraine’s allies put on Moscow and the more resources the West provides Ukraine to bolster its ability to defend itself, the greater the chances for a just and sustainable peace.

 Orest Deychakiwsky may be reached at orestdeychak@gmail.com