Columns 
Originally published on The Ukrainian Weekly
Twenty years ago, on November 21, 2004, I was in the central Ukrainian city of Kirovohrad (now Kropyvnytsky), observing elections as part of the American contingent of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) international election mission. We were there for the runoff of the Ukrainian presidential election, pitting then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych against pro-Western reformer Viktor Yushchenko. They were the two top vote-getters in the October 31 first-round election, but neither had received the required majority needed to win the presidency outright. I have observed more than three dozen elections in nine countries, but never have I come close to witnessing as many flagrant voting violations, including voter intimidation, as I did that day in Kirovohrad. Serious violations were also prevalent elsewhere in Ukraine, especially in the east.
Driving back to Kyiv the next morning, my American colleagues and I were surprised to see thousands of people, many clad in orange, flooding into the center of the city in massive numbers to protest the fraudulent elections. Later that day, walking along Khreshchatyk to Independence Square amid a throng of some 100,000 people and a tent city that seemed to have sprung up out of nowhere was almost a surreal experience. The numbers even exceeded the expectations of Ukraine’s political opposition, which had been planning protests for months, as it became increasingly obvious from the pre-election environment that the elections would be highly problematic.
Even on that first day of what quickly came to be known as the Orange Revolution, it was clear that this peaceful manifestation of the Ukrainian people’s yearning for democracy would have a profound impact on Ukraine internally.
But little could we have imagined that this was, in the words of Peter Dickinson writing in the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, “… the opening act in a geopolitical drama that would eventually lead to the largest European conflict since World War II.”
Throughout 2004, it became evident that President Leonid Kuchma and his oligarchic cronies wanted to hold on to power and neutralize the democratic opposition and its reformist and pro-Western leader, Viktor Yushchenko. The run up to the campaign saw a plethora of violations. These included media harassment and censorship, exemplified by the issuance of presidential administration directives called “temnyky” sent to the media indicating what subjects should be covered and how. Other violations included the denial of equal access to candidates, disruptions of opposition congresses, tax police harassment of the opposition, and incidents of violence.
The backdrop of these pre-election abuses and election fraud that precipitated the Orange Revolution was a Kuchma regime that had become increasingly corrupt and contemptuous of the rule of law and human rights. This was perhaps most starkly demonstrated by its involvement with and cover-up of the murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in 2000.
This backtracking was met with dismay by Ukraine’s friends, notably the United States, which actively supported Ukraine’s path toward human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The U.S. Congress, including the Helsinki Commission, reacted with resolutions, hearings, statements and direct interventions with Ukrainian officials. There were modest cuts in U.S. assistance for programs benefiting the central government, reallocating funds to those programs supporting democracy-building efforts and Ukraine’s growing and vibrant civil society.
The United States and other Western countries were not the only ones paying close attention to the Ukrainian elections. At the time, Russia had considerable influence over Ukraine, although in many respects the two countries were quite different. Ukraine, notwithstanding all its flaws, was at least semi-democratic. This was in contrast with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where authoritarianism was gaining the upper hand. Moreover, even under Mr. Kuchma, Ukraine was looking toward the West, which made Moscow nervous.
Whereas the West was encouraging democracy and a free and fair election process in Ukraine, Putin was doing what he could to achieve an outcome favorable to Russia. This meant ensuring the election of Mr. Yanukovych, who also enjoyed the backing of Mr. Kuchma and of Ukraine’s powerful oligarchs, who were not above playing dirty.
The Kremlin was anything but subtle in promoting their preferred candidate and interfering in the Ukrainian electoral process. In fact, in the days before the October 31 first-round election, Putin himself spent four days in Kyiv, making press and public appearances. But Putin’s heavy-handed approach backfired badly.
Weeks of massive, peaceful protests and international pressure emboldened Ukraine’s institutions, so much so that and on December 3, 2004, the Supreme Court invalidated the November 21 election and ordered a repeat vote. On December 26, 2004, my colleague Gene Fishel from the State Department and I observed a clean, free and fair vote in the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions that could not have been a greater contrast from the fraudulent one I had observed in Kirovohrad a month earlier. Mr. Yushchenko was declared the winner.
Putin did not forgive or forget. He became more hostile to the United States, whom he blamed for the Orange Revolution – arrogantly denying the Ukrainian people any agency for their own free choices. And, following the Orange Revolution, Putin began to more assertively stifle democratic expression within Russia itself, fearing that the Russian people could catch an “Orange” virus.
The Orange Revolution was a turning point for the Ukrainian people, who realized they could affect positive change. It was also a defining step in Ukraine’s formal rejection of the imperial Russian project in 1991 – something that was not going to be left unchallenged by the Kremlin. With the Orange Revolution Putin became consumed with a pathological loathing of a Ukraine that dared to see itself apart from Russia – especially one that aspired to a democratic, European future. The Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity nine years later only fueled Putin’s determination to crush Ukraine, which became fully manifested with the February 2022 full-scale invasion.
We are at a critical juncture, with questions about whether the United States and some of its partners will remain committed to Ukraine. Notwithstanding the serious challenges that lie ahead, I am convinced that Moscow will fail in its savage attempts to vanquish the Ukrainian nation. Evil will not prevail.